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I. INTRODUCTION
In the impassioned film 12 Angry Men, 12 sweating jurors
decide whether a young man will be put to death.' As they
deliberate, more and more jurors express their reasonable doubt of
the defendant's guilt.2 Nearing the movie's rousing finale, Henry
Fonda's character points out to the other jurors that he noticed that
the crucial eyewitness had marks over her nose, indicating that she
must regularly wear eyeglasses.3 The jury acquits the defendant in
light of the woman's testimony that she looked up from her bed to
see the murder out of her window; she could not have been certain
of the perpetrator's identity because she did not have time to place
her eyeglasses on her face.4 This classic film demonstrates one fine
point, among others: the jury takes everything into account in
rendering its verdict.
Imagine a jury considering a police officer's testimony about
her first "big break" in an investigation. The prosecutor asks
Officer Mary McFadden what a particular informant told her about
the defendant. Officer McFadden replies that the informant said
that he had known the defendant for years as a partner in crime and
that the defendant was the one who committed the criminal act.
Normally, defense counsel would object on hearsay grounds
because Officer McFadden testified to an out-of-court statement
not made under oath and used to prove the defendant's guilt.5 The
Louisiana explanatory exception would purport to admit the
statement, not to prove the defendant's guilt, but to show Officer
McFadden's valid reason for suspecting the defendant to be the
perpetrator.6 The explanatory exception is a principle that allows a
testifying law enforcement official like Officer McFadden to refer
to out-of-court statements made to the official to explain the
criminal investigation or the officer's conduct.7 Even though the
judge who permits the use of the explanatory exception might
instruct the jury to only consider the out-of-court statement as
relevant to the officer's conduct, the judge cannot "unring the
Copyright 2011, by JOSHUA P. CLAYTON.
1. 12 ANGRY MEN (United Artists 1957).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See discussion infra Part II.A.
6. See discussion infra Part II.B.
7. See infra text accompanying note 50.
bell" 8-an out-of-court speaker not under oath said the defendant
is guilty.
The Louisiana Code of Evidence (LCE) is designed to ensure
that jurors take appropriate evidence into account 9 including
police testimony that is omnipresent in criminal trials.1 Louisiana
appellate courts regularly violate the LCE through winking at
improper use of the explanatory exception in the trial courts
allowing jurors to take improper police testimony into account."'
Prosecutorial abuse of the exception by engaging in illegitimate
storytelling through hearsay statements is not as much to blame as
is the courts' unfaithfulness to Louisiana's statutory hearsay
framework. Trial courts and reviewing appellate courts have yet to
apply the exception in a way that properly balances the
prosecution's need to present evidence with the defendant's
statutory right to not have inadmissible hearsay evidence heaped
up against him.
This Comment explains how Louisiana courts should properly
apply the explanatory exception. Part II describes the explanatory
exception through examining its adoption from the federal
jurisprudence, its relation to the Louisiana rule of hearsay, and its
potentially limited use. Part III demonstrates the illicit judicial use
of the explanatory exception by showing how the courts have
refused to implement Louisiana Supreme Court directives. Part III
also illustrates specific areas of abuse by the appellate courts-
allowing testimony about informants' statements, testimony to
explain the reason for the defendant's arrest, testimony
establishing a sequence of events, and testimony as to conduct that
is an assertion. Part IV proposes solutions to restore legality to the
application of the exception: (1) limiting the use and content of
officers' testimony, (2) performing a vigilant harmless error
analysis, and (3) reformulating the exception for logical
consistency. This Comment concludes that if the explanatory
exception is to have continued existence, the judiciary should give
less weight to prosecutorial storytelling and more attention to
establishing proper norms for prosecutorial questioning of police
witnesses.
8. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 105:1 (6th
ed. 2006).
9. See LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 103(C) (2006) (inadmissible evidence
should not be suggested to the jury by any means).
10. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
11. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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II. ANATOMY OF AN ANECDOTE: WHAT IS THE EXPLANATORY
EXCEPTION?
A. The Rule: Hearsay
Although a large portion of the general populace is familiar
Wi 011d tiieiIi "iedarsay, W11UL IL 15 bafles even experienced legal
minds.' 3 However, the LCE clearly defines hearsay: "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."' 4 Put simply, if the statement was made outside of the
present courtroom proceeding, its substance cannot be repeated in
court to prove that the words within the statement are true. The
hearsay rule is necessary to ensure that the witness makes his
assertion under oath and subject to cross-examination and to
permit the jury to assess the witness's credibility through
observing the witness's demeanor while making the statement.
Requiring the out-of-court declarantl 6 to come into court also
establishes the witness's competency to testify."
Two mechanisms enable out-of-court statements to come into
court without violating the hearsay rule: hearsay exceptions and
nonhearsay. Hearsay exceptions exist solely in statutes.19
Nonhearsay is an out-of-court statement not offered to prove the
truth of the words in the statement, meaning that the hearsay rule
12. See IRVING J. KLEIN, LAW OF EVIDENCE FOR POLICE 98 (2d ed. 1978).
13. See FRANK L. MARAIST, EVIDENCE AND PROOF § 10.1, in 19 LOuISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 155 n.4 (1999).
14. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 801(C) (2006).
15. State v. Wille, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1329 (La. 1990) (citing California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154 (1970)).
16. A declarant is a person who makes a statement. LA. CODE EVID. ANN.
art. 801(B) (2006).
17. MARAIST, supra note 13, § 10.1, at 156; see also Buckbee v. United Gas
Pipe Line Co., 561 So. 2d 76, 80 (La. 1990) (citing 4 JACK WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE §§ 800-1 to -5 (1988)).
18. Classification of an out-of-court statement as hearsay, as admissible
evidence under a statutory exception, or as nonhearsay is governed by the LCE.
The Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledges that in deciding whether a given
statement violates the hearsay rule, reference to Louisiana jurisprudence predating
the LCE's enactment is proper. See Garza v. Delta Tau Delta Fraternity Nat'l, 948
So. 2d 84, 89 (La. 2006). Furthermore, one should consider the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) when classifying an out-of-court statement because the LCE is
modeled after the FRE, Act No. 515, § 1, 1988 La. Acts 1086 ("Introductory
Note" to Chapter 8), and the Louisiana Supreme Court approves the use of federal
case law interpreting the FRE as persuasive authority in interpreting the LCE, see
State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1122-23 (La. 1993).
19. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 802 (2006).
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does not apply.20 In other words, an out-of-court statement is
nonhearsay if the words spoken have independent relevance,
regardless of whether they are true.2 1 Nonhearsay exists when an
out-of-court statement falls into one of several general categories: 22
causation of legal consequences, attack of a witness's
credibility, 24 demonstration of a declarant's state of mind,2 5 or
demonstration of a hearer's state of mind.26 As will be discussed,
the explanatory exception is actually a type of nonhearsay that
often demonstrates the hearer's state of mind.27
B. The "Exception ": Explanation
The explanatory exception arises through the testimony of a
law enforcement official. The following scenario illustrates the
explanatory exception: Joe Schmeaux, whose "street name" is
"Dopey," is being tried before a jury for possession of an illegal
weapon. The State of Louisiana calls as its first witness Officer
Mary McFadden, who states that her investigation started when a
voice crackled over her radio, diverting her from her patrol route to
investigate suspicious activity. She later testifies that upon
investigation, she encountered an informant who said that
"Dopey," one block down the street, was peddling drugs and
wearing a red hooded jacket and brown corduroy pants. The
prosecutor further elicits from McFadden that she traveled a block
down the street and saw someone who matched the description of
"Dopey." She states that as she approached the suspect, she heard a
raspy-voiced gentleman across the street from the suspect shout,
"Dopey, they're going to find that AK-47 this time, buster!" The
officer then testifies that she knew that possession of an AK-47
requires a permit 29 and that she patted down the suspect, found an
AK-47 on his person, and arrested the suspect on the spot.
Within Officer McFadden's testimony are three out-of-court
statements: the initial radio message, the informant's naming and
20. See id. art. 801(C).
21. See MARAIST, supra note 13, § 10.1, at 157. For a definition of
relevance, see infra note 56.
22. Buckbee, 561 So. 2d at 80; MARAIST, supra note 13, § 10.1, at 157.
23. See Melancon v. Hyatt Corp., 589 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (La. Ct. App. 1st
1991).
24. See MARAIST, supra note 13, § 10.1, at 157.
25. Id.
26. See Buckbee, 561 So. 2d at 81; MARAIST, supra note 13, § 10.1, at 157.
27. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
29. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1781-:1783 (2008)
(addressing required registration of certain firearms).
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describing the defendant, and the raspy-voiced man's naming the
defendant and indicating that he had a weapon. Each of these
statements could be offered to prove the truth of the words in them
and, thus, be hearsay. This is where the explanatory exception
becomes applicable: under its broadest formulation, these
statements would be proper nonhearsay because the prosecutor did
not elicit these statements from McFadden to prove that there was
suspicious activity, that Schnmeaux was wearing cuduuy puns, O
that Schmeaux was about to be arrested for his possession of an
illegal weapon. Instead, the statements were offered to explain the
officer's progressing motivation to act as she did during the
criminal investigation and to develop the sequence of events
leading to the defendant's arrest. 30
In Louisiana, a court does not admit McFadden's testimony
through an "exception," properly speaking. The adoption of the
LCE brought with it a clear prohibition that hearsay is not
admissible unless it falls within an exception provided by the LCE
itself or other legislation. 3 1 Additionally, the LCE closed the door
to new jurisprudential, non-statutory exceptions.32 Evidence is
admissible under the explanatory exception only because it is not a
jurisprudential exception, but really an application of nonhearsay.
Out of the possible categories of nonhearsay, the explanatory
exception falls most comfortably under the "hearer's state of
mind" category. 33 In one Louisiana case, the defendant testified
that his employer told him what his job duties entailed to show that
he did not have the intent that is a requisite element of the crime of
payroll fraud and theft. 34 The court held that the statement was
nonhearsay, relevant to the defendant-employee's state of mind.s
Just as the employee needed the out-of-court statement to prove his
state of mind, Officer McFadden may need to demonstrate her
motivation for subsequent conduct by using the raspy-voiced
gentleman's statement. The statement would be nonhearsay,
30. See infra text accompanying note 50.
31. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 802 (2006).
32. Id. cmt. b. Further, the adoption of the LCE may have placed limits on
the explanatory exception inherent within the hearsay articles. For instance, pre-
LCE, the Louisiana Supreme Court held in State v. Murphy, 309 So. 2d 134, 135
(La. 1975), that although an officer may state his mind as to why he arrested a
defendant, he cannot explain the substance of the statement, for example, that
the declarant pointed to the defendant as guilty. Louisiana law was not
substantially changed by the adoption of article 802, so such limitations may
still exist. See LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 802 cmt. a (2006).
33. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
34. State v. Jones, 558 So. 2d 546, 548-50 (La. 1990).
35. Id.
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relevant to establish the officer's state of mind.36 To define the
explanatory exception's modem parameters within which
statements may establish an officer's state of mind, the exception's
history is crucial.
C. What It Was and What It Is
The explanatory exception dates back perhaps as far as a
century ago in federal courts. In 1919, the federal Sixth Circuit, in
the pioneering case Biandi v. United States, refused to admit a
prosecuting witness's testimony of an out-of-court statement to
explain the witness's subsequent actions.37 The out-of-court
statement was a report of criminal activity tending to prove the
defendant's guilt, proof that could not be admitted through hearsay
evidence. 38 In the 1920s, following Biandi, the federal circuit
courts disallowed officer testimony about general complaints of
criminal activity39 and reports from unidentified informants
warning of impending crimes. 40 The courts reasoned that such
evidence was hearsay, incompetent, and highly prejudicial.4 In
1932, the First Circuit in Enrique Rivera v. United States allowed
officers to testify that they acted upon certain information to
explain their actions, but not to testify in detail as to what they
were told, which would be hearsay.42
The Louisiana Supreme Court joined the discussion by the
mid-twentieth century. In the 1948 case State v. Kimble, the court's
infant venture quoted Enrique and established a fairly firm
standard: a police officer may testify that he made an arrest or
search and seizure as a result of information received, but "the
exception is limited to the statement of the fact." 43 In Kimble,
because the officer testified to the nature of the complaint, he was
not merely testifying to the fact that information was received but
also to what someone else told him, thus violating the hearsay
rule." In 1970, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Favre
frequently cited to Kimble in holding that where an officer testified
36. The officer's state of mind would have to be the subject of proper
relevance. See LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 401 (2006) (evidence must have
probative worth to a fact that is of consequence to determining the case).
37. 259 F. 93 (6th Cir. 1919).
38. Id. at 93.
39. Mattson v. United States, 7 F.2d 427, 428 (8th Cir. 1925).
40. Bolt v. United States, 2 F.2d 922, 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
41. Mattson, 7 F.2d at 427-28; Bolt, 2 F.2d at 922-23.
42. 57 F.2d 816, 820 (1st Cir. 1932).
43. State v. Kimble, 36 So. 2d 637, 638 (La. 1948).
44. Id. at 638-39.
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that information leading to the defendant's arrest came from a
reliable informant, the testimony was proper nonhearsay because it
did not divulge the substance of any out-of-court statements. 45 As
evidenced by these early cases, the original formulation of the rule
forbade testimony as to an out-of-court declarant's words, though
the officer could state that credible or helpful statements were
made to him in the course of investigating a crime.
The bewildering fauCor is ilai suiiewhere along the line, the
rule was greatly broadened. A perusal of Louisiana and federal
jurisprudence in the 1980s and 1990s shows how broad the rule
has become: officers may testify as to statements given to them by
other persons involved in the case that help to explain the sequence
of events that led to an arrest.46 By 1990, even the Louisiana
Supreme Court acknowledged "widespread abuse" of the
explanatory exception. 47 Although the Louisiana rule once limited
officers to testifying that they acted "upon information received,',4
now courts allow officers to actually state the content of the out-of-
court statements for the nonhearsay purpose of explaining the
officer's conduct and the investigation.4  Thus, the explanatory
exception may be modernly defined as the principle that allows
testifying law enforcement officials to explain their actions by
referring to out-of-court statements made to them by other persons
involved in the case, without violating the hearsay rule.5 0
45. State v. Favre, 232 So. 2d 479, 483 (La. 1970).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, 425 (7th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Bowser,
941 F.2d 1019, 1021 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Lazcano, 881 F.2d 402,
407 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985);
State v. Edwards, 406 So. 2d 1331, 1349 (La. 1981) (citing State v. Calloway,
324 So. 2d 801, 809 (La. 1976)); State v. Williams, 735 So. 2d 62, 75-76 (La.
Ct. App. 5th 1999); State v. Keelen, 670 So. 2d 578, 582 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1996)
(citing State v. Watson, 449 So. 2d 1321, 1328 (La. 1984)); State v. Clay, 623
So. 2d 211, 214 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1993); State v. Byrd, 540 So. 2d 1110, 1114
(La. Ct. App. 1st 1989); State v. Bums, 504 So. 2d 124, 152 (La. Ct. App. 2d
1987); State v. Washington, 461 So. 2d 340, 341 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1984). This is
but a fraction of extant examples.
47. State v. Wille, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1331 (La. 1990) (citing EDWARD W.
CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 249 (3d ed. 1984)).
48. See, e.g., Favre, 232 So. 2d at 483.
49. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 801:5; STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET
AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1468 (7th ed. 1998); JOHN W.
STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 249 (5th ed. 1999).
50. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1164 (2006).
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D. Scope of the Exception
1. Relevancy
Relevancy governs the scope of the explanatory exception.5 1
Statements that fall under the exception may have a permissible
nonhearsay aspect and always have an impermissible hearsay
aspect.52 When a permissible nonhearsay aspect exists, such a
statement is probative to explain the officer's response or state of
mind, or even the "background of the case." 53 The always-present
impermissible hearsay aspect is the likelihood that the jury will
consider the statement as evidence of the fact asserted, which
improperly points to the defendant's guilt. 54 Therefore, the scope
of the exception is determined using an LCE article 401/403
relevancy analysis to determine if a given statement is relevant to a
nonhearsay fact.5 5
An article 401/403 analysis requires that the out-of-court
statement have probative value in tending to prove a fact that helps
determine the outcome of the criminal case,5 6 and its admission
must not cause unfair prejudice to the defendant. A particular
out-of-court statement that incriminates the defendant may "move
the decision maker's mind off dead center" as to why an officer did
what he did or how the case developed.5 8 However, if the
defendant is unfairly prejudiced, i.e., if the statement possesses an
undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, then
the statement should not be admitted. 9 Because a statement
containing an assertion of criminality could cause the jury to use
the statement as proof of the truth of the words spoken, article 403
51. See, e.g., Wille, 559 So. 2d at 1331.
52. Id.
53. SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 49, at 1468.
54. GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 801:5.
55. See supra text accompanying note 51; infra text accompanying notes
56-60.
56. See LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 401 (2006) ('Relevant evidence' means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.").
57. See id. art. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, or waste of time.").
58. See MARAIST, supra note 13, § 5.1, at 66. "Moving the mind off dead
center" is assisting the fact finder in determining the existence of a fact at issue.
Id.
59. FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's note.
2011] 1267
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would forbid admission of the statement-a hearsay use suggests a
decision on an improper basis.6 0
2. Verbal Statements v. Conduct
The scope of the explanatory exception also entails
consideration of whether the evidence within an officer's
testimony is a verbal statement or physical conduct. Both an oral
assertion and nonverbal conduct intended by the actor as an
assertion meet the hearsay definition.61 If an officer testifies as to
conduct that was intended by the actor to be an assertion, the
explanatory exception may admit the out-of-court action-statement
to explain the officer's conduct. Picture Officer McFadden
testifying that, after showing a witness a photo line-up of potential
suspects, she was able to obtain an arrest warrant for the defendant
Schmeaux and to arrest him. McFadden's testimony as to her out-
of-court action in obtaining the warrant and arresting Schmeaux is
potentially an assertion of guilt because implicit in her narrative is
the detail that the witness identified Schmeaux. 62 If a court found
that McFadden's conduct was a statement,63 the court could
nonetheless admit the "statement" under the explanatory exception
as nonhearsay, probative to the ongoing investigation.
60. SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 49, at 1468. Even if a statement is
inadmissible under the explanatory exception because of non-relevance to a
proper nonhearsay purpose or because of unfair prejudice, the statement still
could be admitted under a statutory hearsay exception, in some cases. See State
v. Wade, 908 So. 2d 1220, 1231 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2005) (finding a statement
inadmissible not just because the explanatory exception did not apply but also
because no statutory exception applied). One example is res gestae under article
801(D)(4), a statutory exception permitting the admission of a statement that is
an event speaking for itself under the immediate pressure of the occurrence and
that is an immediate incident of the criminal act. LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art.
801 (D)(4) (2006); see also infra note 119 (regarding the labeling of res gestae as
an "exception"). A court would find the statement to meet the res gestae
definition if the statement was integrally connected to the event under scrutiny.
GEORGE W. PUGH ET AL., HANDBOOK ON LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW 619
(2009). Additionally, the statement could be admitted under one of more than 30
exceptions in LCE articles 803, 803.1, and 804. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. arts. 803-
804 (2006 & Supp. 2011). However, even if a statement would survive hearsay
scrutiny allowing admittance under the explanatory exception, the statement
could still be excluded on relevancy grounds. See State v. Hicks, 607 So. 2d
937, 946-47 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1992) (a bare assertion by the prosecution that the
statement is not offered for its truth is insufficient).
61. LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art. 801(A) (2006).
62. See State v. Banford, 653 So. 2d 671, 674-75 (La. Ct. App. 5th 1995).
63. See STRONG ET AL., supra note 49, § 250 (the burden of establishing that
an actor intended for his conduct to be an assertion should be placed upon the
party urging the hearsay objection).
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3. Constitutional Restrictions
The most significant difference between verbal statements and
conduct-type statements is that if the explanatory exception attempts
to admit the former, the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
could stand in the way of such an evidence proffer. 4 The
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."65 Statements admitted under the explanator exception
sometimes breach the defendant's right of confrontation. The U.S.
Supreme Court's landmark Confrontation Clause decision in
Crawford v. Washington limits the use of "testimonial" out-of-court
statements to when the out-of-court declarant (1) is unavailable at
the trial and ( has been available for prior cross-examination by
the defendant. Under Crawford, if a statement admitted under the
explanatory exception is "testimonial" and the defendant has had no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the U.S. Constitution is
violated.6 8
4. Other Evidentiary Limitations
Notwithstanding a statement's relevant, nonhearsay, and
constitutional uses, a court may disallow the explanatory exception
on other evidentiary grounds. For example, if a statement has
potential use as "other crimes" evidence, article 404 could prevent
its admissibility because evidence of other crimes is not admissible
to prove the defendant's guilt in the present trial.69 McFadden may
not be allowed to testify that the confidential informant told her
64. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. A proffer is an offer of evidence. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1329 (9th ed. 2009).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Louisiana Constitution similarly provides
that "[a]n accused is entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him." LA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
66. See State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 737 (La. 1992) (citing State v.
Banks, 439 So. 2d 407 (La. 1983)) ("Law enforcement officers may not testify
as to the contents of an informant's tip because such testimony violates the
accused's constitutional right to confront and cross-examine his accusers.").
67. 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). The Court's Confrontation Clause case law
continues to develop. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct.
2527 (2009); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008); Washington v. Davis,
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
68. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
69. LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art. 404(B)(1) (2006).
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that "Dopey" had previously been indicted for other drug crimes. 70
Further, if the out-of-court statement was made by a declarant who
did not have firsthand knowledge of the facts in his statement7 or
the officer is not competent to testify as to what the declarant
said,72 the explanatory exception would be denied. Or, if the
content of the declarant's statement contains improper lay opinion,
the officer would not be allowed to testify regarding the
statement.7 3
Though the issues with the exception are legion, including the
Confrontation Clause, various evidentiary rules, and interaction
with other hearsay exceptions, the present focus is the exception's
potential to violate the LCE hearsay framework. That potential has
been tragically realized through abuse by Louisiana appellate
courts.
III. LOUISIANA'S APPLICATION OF THE EXPLANATORY EXCEPTION:
A TUMULTUOUS TALE
Louisiana's embrace of this particular application of
nonhearsay surpasses the federal use of the principle, with the
State's courts christening it the "explanatory exception." 74
Throughout the 1990s, the Louisiana Supreme Court finally
tackled the status of the exception in Louisiana and laid down
guidelines that the trial courts and reviewing appellate courts
subsequently either neglected or wholesale refused to implement.75
The question is, "Where did our courts get off track?"
70. See United States v. Hernandez, 750 F.2d 1256, 1258 (5th Cir. 1985);
State v. Williams, 735 So. 2d 62, 76 (La. Ct. App. 5th 1999).
71. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 602 (2006) (a witness may only testify to a
matter if he has personal knowledge of it).
72. See State v. Moses, 932 So. 2d 701, 712 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2006)
(finding that an officer was not competent to testify as to what was in the
declarant's mind because such testimony would have been speculative).
73. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 701 (2006) (lay witnesses may only give
opinions that are both rationally based on their perceptions and helpful to the
fact finder in more clearly understanding the testimony or determining a fact at
issue).
74. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 737 (La. 1992); State v. Legendre, 942
So. 2d 45, 50, 52-54 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2006); State v. Antoine, 841 So. 2d 874,
881 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2003); State v. Hawkins, 667 So. 2d 1070, 1080 (La. Ct.
App. 4th 1995), aff'd, 688 So. 2d 473 (La. 1997); State v. Hall, 624 So. 2d 927,
930 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1993); State v. Preston, 623 So. 2d 938, 941 (La. Ct. App.
4th 1993).
75. See discussion infra Part III.A, .C.
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A. The Supreme Court Trilogy
The seminal and oft-quoted Louisiana Supreme Court
explanatory exception case of State v. Wille arrived in 1990.76 At
the time, the Louisiana Supreme Court had fallow ground to break
because 1990 marked the one-year anniversary of the fledgling
LCE." Wille is the first of a trilogy of 1990s cases that became the
appellate courts' precedents of choice-at least in name.
Because the case involved a brutal child rape and murder
resulting in a first degree murder conviction and a death penalty
sentence, the facts of Wille could not have been more antipathetic
to the defendant. 8 The defendant objected to an FBI special
agent's extensive testimony that eyewitnesses to the murder
implicated the defendant as the perpetrator and that the
eyewitnesses' assertions led the agent to conclude that the
defendant was the prime suspect in the case.7 9 The prosecuting
attorney argued that the testimony was admissible to explain the
sequence of events, from the viewpoint of the investigating officer,
leading to the defendant's arrest. 80 The court held that because
there was no true issue as to the propriety of the officer's actions,
the statements should have been excluded as hearsay, bearing a
high potential for use by the jury as proof of the defendant's
guilt.
The court established several premises that became important
for analyzing the explanatory exception. First, the court fumed that
the explanatory exception is an area of "widespread abuse."8 2
Second, the court suggested that the exception is probably not
properly used if the statement significantly connects the defendant
with the crime. 83 Third, the court affirmed the significant
interrelation of the rules of relevancy and hearsay and the necessity
of weighing prosecutorial need of the statement against unfair
prejudice to the defendant. 84 The court restrictively stated that an
investigating officer's trial testimony to explain his conduct
76. 559 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1990).
77. Act No. 515, § 1, 1988 La. Acts 1086.
78. Wille, 559 So. 2d at 1323-24.
79. Id. at 1329.
80. Id
81. Id at 1331.
82. Id. (citing CLEARY ET AL., supra note 47, § 249).
83. Id. at 1329 (distinguishing the prosecution's cited cases, in which the
out-of-court assertions did not significantly connect the defendant with the
crime, unlike the present case).
84. Id. at 1331.
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"almost always has only marginal relevance at best."85 Despite
having faced facts of horrible actions by the defendant, the court
impartially refused to allow a violation of the hearsay rule.
Two years later, the supreme court faced a much less heinous
crime, possession of methamphetamine, in State v. Hearold.86 The
statements at issue were subtler: an officer testified that he
received information that the defendant and another suspect were
involved in narcotics dealings in the eastern part of a particular
parish.87 The court held that the officer's testimony as to the
contents of an informant's tip was impermissible hearsay.8 8
Additionally, other officers' testimonies that they had received
many complaints about the defendant being involved in drug
dealing included inadmissible hearsay.8 9 The trial court's error in
admitting this evidence was harmful enough for the court to
reverse the conviction.90 The court's reasoning constituted a
landmark line of demarcation:
Generally, an explanation of the officer's actions should
never be an acceptable basis upon which to admit an out-
of-court declaration when the so-called "explanation"
involves a direct assertion of criminal activity against the
accused.. .. Absent some unique circumstances in which
the explanation of purpose is probative evidence of a
contested fact, such hearsay evidence should not be
admitted under an "explanation" exception.
[In this caseI [t]he jury had no opportunity to evaluate
the out-of-court declarant whose credibility may have been
substantially less than that of a police officer testifying in
full uniform.91
Hearold clarifies Wille's restrictions. First, the "explanation
exception" is not justifiably used when the statement directly
implicates the accused, except in a "unique circumstance" in which
the officer's conduct or purpose for acting is a "contested fact." 92
The "contested fact" standard requires the defense and prosecution
to dispute the propriety of the officer's conduct for the exception to
apply. This is actually narrower than a normal relevance standard,
85. Id.
86. 603 So. 2d 731, 733 (La. 1992).
87. Id. at 737.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 738.
90. Id. at 739.
91. Id. at 737-38 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 737.
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under which a fact only has to be of consequence to the
determination of the action.93
Second, the supreme court focuses on jurors' thought processes
in applying the exception. Hearold states that because a jury may
find an out-of-court declarant to have substantially less credibility
than a testifying fully uniformed police officer, the explanatory
exception may improperly abrogate the jury's credibility
determination. Such an assumption by the court represents a
stance that the court has the capability to objectiveX5 determine the
effect that such a statement would have on the jury.
The trilogy culminated in State v. Broadway in 1999.9 In
Broadway, the trial court convicted the defendant of first degree
murder and sentenced the defendant to death.97 At trial, the
prosecution elicited from two detectives the circumstances under
which they had first heard the defendant's name.9 8 The detectives
testified that a particular suspect gave the defendant's name while
under interrogation. 99 The supreme court once again refused to
uncage the explanatory exception. The prosecution "seriously
crossed over the line" drawn by the Wille-Hearold decisions
through deliberately eliciting testimony involving out-of-court
statements pointing toward the defendant's culpability.' The
statements were hearsay even though the verbatim content of the
statements was not placed before jurors.'ot
Although the Broadway decision cites to Wille and Hearold in
denying the exception, some dubious language in the opinion calls
into question the Hearold "contested fact" standard of
relevancy.102 The court stated that although information about the
course of a police investigation is not relevant to any essential
93. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 401 (2006).
94. Hearold, 603 So. 2d at 738.
95. Such a determination could not be made subjectively because a juror
may not testify as to the effect of anything that influenced his assent to or
dissent from the verdict, LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 606(B) (2006), and a
credibility determination is ultimately the jury's as the fact finder, see Lirette v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 563 So. 2d 850, 852 (La. 1990).
96. 753 So. 2d 801 (La. 1999). See generally Joelle Hervic, Statements of
Bystanders to Police Officers Containing an Accusation of Criminal Conduct
Offered to Explain Subsequent Police Conduct, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 771, 777
(2001) (suggesting that Broadway's approach comes closest to upholding the
intent of the FRE and U.S. Constitution in addressing admissibility of
bystanders' statements to police officers).
97. Broadway, 753 So. 2d at 805-07.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 809.
101. Id.
102. See State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 737 (La. 1992).
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elements of the crime, it may be useful in drawing the "full
picture" for the jury, to show that police did not arrest the
defendant "out of thin air," but rather as a result of a "thorough
professional investigation." 0 3 Still, the court concluded that the
prosecution may not use the "guise" of police investigational
relevancy to place before the jury an out-of-court declaration of
criminal accusation.1 04
B. Too Much Hearsay Relevancy
The Louisiana Supreme Court's ground rules regarding the
exception established guidelines for the courts to determine
whether police testimony accords with Louisiana's relevancy
standards. Using the article 401/403 relevancy balancing test, a
court can often see through the prosecution's argument to
determine that a statement is actually being offered as proof of
criminal wrongdoing, though cloaked in the guise of the
explanatory exception. For example, it is easy to determine that the
prosecution's subjective reason for offering a statement is to prove
its truth when the statement was made by the sole eyewitness to the
crime, was primarily concerned with identification procedures, was
barren of explanatory background details, and specifically named
the defendant as the perpetrator. 0 5 Additionally, the prosecution's
actual intent in offering a statement as hearsay is obvious when the
prosecution refers back to the out-of-court statement in closing
argument. 06
In contrast, what determines whether a statement is "offered"
to prove its own truth when the prosecution does not leave helpful
hints along the way? This ambiguity has resulted in judicial
confusion over whether the offeror's actual intent or the effect of
the statement's use determines whether a statement is offered for
its truth. Some court decisions suggest that if the statement's
objectively determinable effect is that the jury will use it as proof
of the defendant's iilt, then the statement has been "offered" for a
hearsay purpose. Problematically, other appellate opinions
103. Broadway, 753 So. 2d at 809.
104. Id. at 810.
105. State v. Jones, 841 So. 2d 965, 972, 974-75 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2003).
106. See United States v. Hernandez, 750 F.2d 1256, 1257-58 (5th Cir.
1985); Broadway, 753 So. 2d at 807.
107. See, e.g., Hearold, 603 So. 2d at 738 (finding that the statement served
no other purpose than to show the defendant's guilt). See also State v. Bean, 582
So. 2d 947, 950 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1991), finding that where the officer testified
that a man told the officer, who was controlling a crowd at a house fire, that the
victim had been shot in the street, the statement was nonhearsay. The statement
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suggest that the proper focus in determining if a statement is
unfairly prejudicial is upon the actual intent of the prosecution as
offeror of the statement. 08 Such a result conveys the court's
disregard of the obvious effect of such a statement in spotlighting
the accused's guilt.
More than academic dawdling, the distinction bespeaks the
Louisiana Supreme Court's position that, under an article 401/403
analysis, the prosecution's alleged need of a statement for a proper
use must be balanced against the potential for unfair prejudice
from jury misuse. 0 9 Focusing on the prosecution's ostensible
intent may ignore unfair prejudice to the defendant under article
403. Therefore, the courts could better fulfill their mandate to
consider the possibility of unfair prejudice if they considered the
objective effect that a statement is likely to have on the jury.
C. Uncaging of the Beast: Inconsistent Appellate Application
Although Louisiana court opinions as a whole acknowledge a
general mandate to consider the jury's use of out-of-court
statements, the devil is in the details. While paying lip service to
supreme court opinions circumscribing proper relevance of out-of-
court statements, the Louisiana circuit courts of appeal apply the
exception so inconsistently that it is as if the LCE is not binding
and the supreme court has never spoken on the issue. When a
circuit court states that the only purpose of an out-of-court
statement was to prove that the "[d]efendant was the one who
pulled the trigger that killed the [v]ictim," and then two paragraphs
later declares that the statement was properly admitted as an
did not have the effect of showing that a particular defendant shot the victim but
merely had the effect of explaining why the officer left the house fire to view the
victim's plight. Id.
108. See, e.g., State v. Smothers, 927 So. 2d 484, 491 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2006)
(State intended to use the physical descriptions of the perpetrator in a taped 911
statement to bolster State's case as to defendant's identity); Evangelista v. U.S.
Welding Serv., Inc., 898 So. 2d 438, 441 n.1 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2004) (whether a
police report is inadmissible hearsay depends upon the "purpose" for which it is
offered); State v. Antoine, 841 So. 2d 874, 881 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2003)
(prosecution intended the officer's testimony to indirectly place before the jury
an assertion of the defendant's guilt); State v. Cowart, 815 So. 2d 275, 289 (La.
Ct. App. 5th 2002) (statement was nonhearsay even though it involved a witness
saying that he saw the defendant commit the criminal act).
109. Broadway, 753 So. 2d at 810; Hearold, 603 So. 2d at 737; State v.
Wille, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1331 (La. 1990).
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explanation of the events leading to the defendant's arrest,
obviously something is amiss.I10
1. Blatant Explanatory Exception Abuse
Perhaps the most inexcusable abuse of the exception occurs in
instances that clearly violate the terms of the LCE, supreme court
holdings, or both. One such area of abuse is the confusion of
nonhearsay with proper statutory hearsay exceptions.' Because
legal hearsay exceptions are only those created by statute,112
treating a hearsay statement that does not fit under a statutory
exception as a statement admissible under an explanatory
exception is particularly egregious. The Louisiana courts' decision
to call it the "explanatory exception" "3 is a misnomer to begin
with: it is not spelled out in a statute, so it cannot be an exception.
One court went as far as to carelessly label the explanatory
exception as "one such exception" under Louisiana's statutory
framework."14
More specifically, Louisiana appellate courts muddle the lines
between specific LCE hearsay exceptions and nonhearsay that is
admissible under the explanatory exception. Confusing res gestae
under article 801(D)(4) 1s with the explanatory exception is one
such offense.116 The Louisiana Fourth Circuit admitted detectives'
and officers' testimony as to out-of-court conversations under the
"res gestae exception" because officers may refer to statements
made by others to explain the officers' own actions or to explain
the sequence of events leading to the defendant's arrest." 7 The
court clearly confused res gestae with the explanatory exception
because the court used large Hearold-Wille quotes to conclude that
res gestae applied."' 8 Not only does the opinion inaccurately fail to
differentiate res gestae from nonhearsay, but the court's holding,
110. See State v. Jones, 999 So. 2d 239, 250-51 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008). A
most exacting scrutiny of the court's opinion reveals that the court may have
been referring to two different statements, but the treatment of the issue is
sufficiently haphazard to create an apparently absurd result.
111. See infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
112. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 802 (2006).
113. See supra text accompanying note 74.
114. See State v. Grant, 954 So. 2d 823, 833 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007). But see
State v. Hunt, 797 So. 2d 138, 142 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2001) (correctly recognizing
that the State did not need to use the article 803(3) exception because the
statement at issue was nonhearsay).
115. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 801(D)(4) (2006).
116. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
117. State v. Dangerfield, 816 So. 2d 885, 896 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2002).
118. Id. at 896-97.
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that portions of the testimony fit within the res gestae exception
and that others were inadmissible, also creates a vague standard for
future explanatory exception cases."
Courts also blend other statutory exceptions with the
explanatory exception. For instance, courts confuse the article
801(D)(1) allowance of an out-of-court declarant who is presenta
trial and subject to cross examination concerning a statement 20
with the explanatory exception. 12 1 Conceivably, the courts'
confusion in this area lies in the fact that if a statement within an
officer's testimony is hearsay, it still could be admitted if it falls
under a valid statutory hearsay objection.122 However, this does not
justify the confusion of nonhearsay with a statutory exception.
Confusion of the two because they both reach the same result of
admitting evidence is theoretically inconsistent.
Another area of abuse demonstrates such evaporation of
consistency: the courts' use of the explanatory exception merely
because the person who made the out-of-court statement to which
the officer testifies is present in court.123 Before the adoption of the
LCE, there was a jurisprudential hearsay exception admitting a
statement when the declarant was present in court; however, that
exception no longer exists.1 24 Still, the courts use this non-existent
119. Id. at 896; see also State v. Granier, 592 So. 2d 883, 888 (La. Ct. App.
4th 1991) (holding that statements made to a police officer to explain his actions
often fall into the res gestae exception and are admissible as nonhearsay to prove
the sequence of events leading to the defendant's arrest).
It is worth noting that under a literal reading of article 801(D), the res gestae
"exception" (and the other "exceptions" of article 801(D)) are actually instances
of statements that are "not hearsay." LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 801(D) (2006).
Under article 801(D)(4), "[a] statement is not hearsay if' it is res gestae-in
contrast with the article 803-04 "exceptions," properly speaking. Id. art.
801(D)(4) (emphasis added). However, this Comment refers to the article
801(D) provisions as statutory "exceptions," for they apparently function in the
same way as the article 803-04 exceptions-to provide a statutory basis for
admitting out-of-court statements that might otherwise fit the definition of
hearsay.
120. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 801(D)(1) (2006).
121. State v. Taylor, 973 So. 2d 83, 97-99 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2007); State v.
Greene, 951 So. 2d 1226, 1232-34 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2007).
122. See State v. Wade, 908 So. 2d 1220, 1231 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2005)
(finding that the statement was inadmissible not only because the explanatory
exception did not apply but also because there was no valid statutory exception
to the hearsay rule).
123. See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
124. See MARAIST, supra note 13, § 10.1, at 159 (citing LA. CODE EvID.
ANN. art. 801(C) (2006)). Hearsay is a statement, "other than one made by the
declarant while testifying." LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 801(C) (2006). Therefore,
even if the declarant testifies at trial, his statement is hearsay because it was
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"declarant is present in court" exception to liberally apply the
explanatory exception. The Louisiana Third Circuit inappropriately
distinguished Wille on the grounds that in the case before it, the
out-of-court declarants were present in court, unlike in Wille.125
The Louisiana Fifth Circuit stated that improper use of the
explanatory exception would be harmless error because the out-of-
court declarant was present in court and subject to cross-
examination.126 The Louisiana Second Circuit said that it was
persuaded that statements were properly admitted under the
explanatory exception because the declarant testified in the
defendant's case-in-chief and was fully questioned on direct and
cross-examination. 2 7
Even more troubling is the appellate courts' refusal to honor
the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in Hearold that a court
may not apply the exception to explain an officer's conduct when
the propriety of the officer's conduct is not contested.1 28 Although
made out of court, not while he was testifying. See also id. art. 802 (foreclosing
non-statutory hearsay exceptions).
125. State v. Jones, 999 So. 2d 239, 250 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008).
126. State v. Moses, 932 So. 2d 701, 712 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2006). The court
further defied logic by stating that the declarant's presence in court rendered
"any possible harm in admitting Detective Wall's statement harmless." Id.
(emphasis added). It is unclear how harm can become harmless, or
macrocosmically, how any thing could be something other than itself. The
courts also say that error is harmless when out-of-court declarants are present at
trial to testify, in contexts outside the explanatory exception. See State v. Smith,
710 So. 2d 1187, 1191 (La. Ct. App. 5th 1998).
127. State v. Wiley, 614 So. 2d 862, 869 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1993). In the
court's opinion, there was not even a showing that the declarant was subjected to
cross-examination concerning the admitted statements. Id.
128. Pre-Wille and pre-Hearold (and thus pre-LCE) decisions in which the
Louisiana Supreme Court admitted out-of-court statements as relevant to an
officer's investigation are not subject to heated criticism because there was little
danger of the statements creating unfair prejudice. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 400
So. 2d 587, 591 (La. 1981) (officer's testimony that he was "advised" of an
incident was nonhearsay because probative as to why the investigation
commenced); State v. Watson, 406 So. 2d 1331, 1349 (La. 1981) (statements
were nonhearsay, relevant to explain the officer's conduct of how the "initially
deflected" investigation got "back on track"); State v. Turner, 392 So. 2d 436,
438, 440 (La. 1980) (where prosecutor repeatedly asked investigator to avoid
repeating what was told him, the investigator's testimony that he had received
information that certain suspects had been receiving contraband was relevant to
explain why the investigator ordered an intrusive strip search of the defendant);
State v. Monk, 315 So. 2d 727, 740 (La. 1975) (officer's testimony of a radio
message about a bank robbery was only offered to explain officer's initiation of
investigation and the jury was instructed as to the limited purpose of the
evidence); State v. Bluain, 315 So. 2d 749, 751, 753 (La. 1975) (where
defendant filed numerous bills of exceptions, some of which put the propriety of
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the propriety of an officer's actions was not at issue, to explain the
officer's actions the Louisiana Second Circuit admitted the
officer's testimony that a subject had divulged that the defendant
was a drug supplier.19 The court's holding was patently erroneous
because Hearold forbade explanation of an officer's actions
involvina 0 a direct assertion of criminal activity against the
accused, and such a direct assertion existed in the statement at
issue.13
2. Specific Categories of Misuse
The more blatant abuses of the explanatory exception give rise
to less conspicuous misuse by the appellate courts. Though
inconspicuous, these misuses are no less repugnant to the hearsay
rule.
a. Informants and Anonymous Tipsters
Returning to the earlier hypothetical involving Officer Mary
McFadden's arrest of Joe Schmeaux, the informant described
Schmeaux as wearing brown corduroy pants and a red hooded
jacket. This is hearsay unless it comes under a statutory exception
or is proper nonhearsay under the explanatory exception. Such out-
of-court statements by informants, especially those providing
the investigation at issue, officer's testimony that he was given the defendant's
license plate number from the victim's purse was nonhearsay because offered to
show how the officer obtained a search warrant to search the defendant's house).
129. State v. Zeigler, 920 So. 2d 949, 954-55 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006).
130. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 737 (La. 1992).
131. Zeigler, 920 So. 2d at 954. See also State v. Grant, 954 So. 2d 823, 833
(La. Ct. App. 2d 2007), erroneously admitting an officer's testimony as to
another officer's out-of-court statement, which implicated the defendant, to
explain why the testifying officer looked into a hole in the wall for drugs. The
police had a search warrant to search the house, making the propriety of the
officer's peek into the hole undisputed. See also Moses, 932 So. 2d at 712,
admitting an officer's testimony that through interviewing the victim's neighbor
he learned the physical description of the defendant's car. The court held this to
be probative to the officer's reason for later locating the defendant's vehicle,
though the officer's conduct was not a contested fact. Id. Making matters worse,
the court erroneously found the neighbor's statement to be "permissible hearsay
testimony" because it did not speak to the defendant's guilt or innocence, only to
the car's physical description. Id. Such reasoning appears insufficient: if the
statement was offered to prove the car's physical description, it was offered to
prove the truth of the words spoken and was inadmissible hearsay!
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officers with anonymous tips, are commonly admitted under the
explanatory exception, often erroneously.' 32
The court in State v. Raby admitted an officer's testimony that
he had received a confidential informant's tip describing the
defendant and the defendant's clothin before the officer
proceeded to a certain housing project. The court in Raby
inappropriately distinguished Hearold on the rationale that in
Hearold, the officer's testimony went beyond the scope of
questions about the substance of the investigation.134 The court
also distinguished Wille by saying that in Wille the statements were
solely relevant to guilt.'3 5 This differentiation of Hearold and Wille
based on superfluous factual differences amounts to disregard of
Hearold's clear holding that the explanatory exception may not be
used to admit the contents of an informant's tip.136 Appellate
courts' use of the exception to admit the contents of an informant's
tip is defiant of supreme court jurisprudence.137
132. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
133. 738 So. 2d 699, 700, 702, 704 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1999).
134. Id. at 704.
135. Id.
136. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 737 (La. 1992). See also State v.
Anderson, 842 So. 2d 1222, 1229 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2003), in which an officer
testified that his search of the defendant's residence, leading to the discovery of
illegal drugs and a firearm, was prompted by his receipt of information from a
confidential informant who identified the defendant's criminal activity. In
admitting the statement, the court cited to a supreme court case for the
proposition that despite its hearsay character, an informant's tip, when proven
accurate, may be used by the fact finder to support the conviction. Id. (citing
State v. Butler, 760 So. 2d 322 (La. 2000)). However, in the cited case the court
actually admitted an informant's tip because "counsel did not object to
testimony regarding the informant's tip, despite its hearsay character." Butler,
760 So. 2d at 323. When the defendant does not object to hearsay evidence, a
court is free to allow the evidence to be admitted. See LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art.
103(A)(1) (2006). Therefore, Anderson not only improperly applied the
explanatory exception, but also misconstrued a Louisiana Supreme Court
holding for support in doing so. Other examples of the circuit courts improperly
admitting informants' statements include State v. Franks, 975 So. 2d 836, 840-
41 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2008), and State v. Williams, 735 So. 2d 62, 75-76 (La. Ct.
App. 5th 1999). It seems the Louisiana First Circuit got it right in State v.
Young, 764 So. 2d 998, 1004-05 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2000). The court held that
where the officer said that he had received numerous citizen complaints, the
testimony included proper nonhearsay used to explain why the police
investigated the specific area. Id. The court properly utilized Hearold's
instruction that only testifying to the content of an informant's tip violates the
hearsay rule. See Hearold, 603 So. 2d at 737; see also State v. Murphy, 309 So.
2d 134, 135 (La. 1975) (police testimony as to an informant's out-of-court
statement was "pure hearsay").
137. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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b. Reason for Arrest
Immediately before Officer McFadden arrested Schmeaux, she
heard the raspy-voiced gentleman imply that Schmeaux was
carrying a weapon. Naturally, the gentleman's statement, coupled
with the verification of the informant's physical description of
Schmeaux, would put McFadden on the defensive to protect
herself from a potentially armed criminal. McFadden's trial
testimony as to the raspy-voiced man's statement could arguably
be nonhearsay, probative to explain McFadden's next step in
patting down Schmeaux for weapons. In this hypothetical case,
perhaps the officer's "reasonable suspicion," or lack thereof, may
be a contested fact, making the out-of-court statement properly
relevant to establish the reason for patting down and then arresting
Schmeaux. Unfortunately, appellate decisions often use the
officer's reason for arrest as a subject of relevance under much
more questionable circumstances.138
State v. Cowart demonstrates the problem with using the
officer's reason for arrest as the subject of an out-of-court
statement's relevancy.' 3 9 Under the rationale that the statement
was nonhearsay, the court admitted an officer's testimony that a
woman told the officer that she had witnessed the shooting for
which the defendant was being tried, which explained what led to
the defendant's arrest.14 0 The court found that the statement was
necessary to show the jury that the statement, coupled with the
officer's inability to confirm the defendant's alibi defense, gave a
valid reason for arrest. 14 1 The problem with such analysis is that it
merely recites precedent for admitting such statements without
applying an article 403 balancing test to determine if the need to
explain why the arrest occurred substantially outweighs the
likelihood of unfair prejudice, a test required by the supreme court
decisions. 42
138. See infra text accompanying notes 139-42.
139. 815 So. 2d 275 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2002).
140. Id. at 289.
141. Id.; see also State v. Soler, 636 So. 2d 1069, 1078 (La. Ct. App. 5th
1994).
142. State v. Broadway, 753 So. 2d 801, 809 (La. 1999); State v. Hearold,
603 So. 2d 731, 738 (La. 1992); State v. Wille, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1331 (La.
1990). For a proper approach, see State v. Davis, 947 So. 2d 48, 56-57 (La. Ct.
App. 5th 2006), where testimony was proper nonhearsay to show why the
officer's suspicions were raised and led to an investigation when the officer
testified that the out-of-court statements did not disclose information about the
defendant.
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c. Sequence ofEvents
Driving along her patrol route, Officer McFadden's train of
thought was interrupted by the crackling fuzz of radio chatter.
Listening to the message being relayed, she quickly realized that
there was suspicious activity that required her to leave her usual
route. In court, McFadden might testify that she received a radio
report of suspicious activity at around 11:00 p.m. Such testimony
would include an out-of-court statement, the radio report.
However, the prosecutor might argue that the statement is
nonhearsay, not offered to prove the fact of suspicious activity, but
to show the timeline of events, painting the "full picture" for the
jury. Using this radio report as evidence relevant to establish the
sequence of events would probably not carry much danger of
unfair prejudice because the statement does not tend to link
Schmeaux to the particular crime for which he is charged. The
statement merely has the tendency to show at what time McFadden
initiated her investigation, not that a particular defendant was
investigated.
Louisiana circuit courts of appeal continue to use the
explanatory exception to explain the sequence of events when,
unlike in Schmeaux's case, there is a high potential for unfair
prejudice. In State v. Dyer, a detective testified that a suspect had
implicated the defendant and that, based upon that information, the
detective compiled a photographic array which included the
defendant's picture, to show to the victim. 43 The court admitted
the statement "to explain the sequence of events leading to the
arrest of the defendant from the viewpoint of the officer." " This
recital ignored the probability that the jury would use the statement
as proof of the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the
robbery. Additionally, the statement led to a photo lineup, so
admission of the hearsay statement pointed toward the defendant's
culpability. The courts' use of the explanatory exception to
establish a sequence of events violates even the most "lenient" of
the three decisive supreme court cases, Broadway, which forbids
the exception when it would indirectly place hearsay evidence of
guilt before the jury.145
143. 794 So. 2d 1, 11-12 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2001).
144. Id.
145. Broadway, 753 So. 2d at 809. For another case erroneously admitting
out-of-court statements as relevant to the sequence of events, see, for example,
State v. Jones, 999 So. 2d 239, 249 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008). The court admitted a
statement because it established a "time line of the [v]ictim's whereabouts prior
to his death." Id. The proper article 403 analysis would have recognized the
potential that a jury would consider the statement for the truth of its assertion as
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d. Conduct as an Assertion
A subtle, complicated area of concern is the possibility that an
officer's testimony as to out-of-court conduct constitutes testimony
as to a "statement" within the meaning of the hearsay rule. Recall
that the definition of hearsay includes out-of-court conduct, if
intended as an assertion.146 Hence, Officer McFadden testifies that
before proceeding to the area of arrest, her confidential informant
said he would tie his shoe across the street from "Dopey" to signify
whom the officer should arrest. McFadden then testifies that she
watched the informant tie his shoe across the street from someone,
whom McFadden then arrested, who turned out to be Schmeaux. It
is likely from McFadden's testimony that the jury would conclude
that the informant's out-of-court action was an assertion. In
testifying that the informant tied his shoe across the street,
McFadden probably implied the informant's intent to assert
Schmeaux's criminal status.
Though the probability of an actor intending his conduct to be
an assertion is generally low,147 appellate decisions show that out-
of-court conduct as an assertion can be a legitimate issue.14 8 I
State v. Banford, a detective testified that he showed a co-
to the victim's whereabouts, potentially linking the particular defendant to that
location and ultimately to the crime itself. Id. See also State v. Warren, 538 So.
2d 1036, 1038-40 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1989), admitting testimony as to an out-of-
court statement that the defendant had stolen a winch as relevant to outline the
sequence of events leading to the defendant being charged for illegal possession
of a stolen thing. Further, the court in State v. Byrd, 540 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (La.
Ct. App. 1st 1989), admitted an officer's testimony that the victim had given the
officer the license plate number of the suspected robber's car and that after
running the number, the officer linked the vehicle to the defendant, as relevant
to explain the sequence of events. On the other hand, State v. Watson, 449 So.
2d 1321, 1328 (La. 1984), is a pre-LCE supreme court case in which use of the
"sequence of events" logic is consistent with the modem Hearold-Wille-
Broadway opinions because the particular statements at issue did not have a high
degree of danger for use as hearsay. The investigating officer testified to the
responses of the victim's roommate when the officer questioned the roommate
as to the victim's activities on the night of the murder. Id. Still, the court did not
apply the later heightened scrutiny of the post-LCE supreme court cases. Id. See
also State v. Calloway, 324 So. 2d 801, 809 (La. 1975), in which the supreme
court, addressing 21 separate bills of exceptions, used the "sequence of events"
rationale to briefly dispense with the defense's hearsay objection to an officer's
testimony that he had received a report on the radio describing the suspects' car
as a black Cadillac.
146. See discussion infra Part II.D.2.
147. STRONG ET AL., supra note 49, § 250.
148. See infra text accompanying notes 149-53.
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defendant a photo line-up and that after showing him the line-u
the officer obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant.'
Although the detective did not testify as to the result of the line-up,
the defendant objected on hearsay grounds that the testimony was a
"back door" means of putting before the jury the co-defendant's
identification of the defendant. so The court admitted the testimony
as nonhearsay-the detective did not repeat the substance of the
out-of-court statement made to him-and stated that even if there
was a "hearsay implication," the explanatory exception would
admit the statement. '5 The court failed to consider whether the
officer's conduct in obtaining an arrest warrant after the photo line-
up was an out-of-court assertion that the co-defendant implicated
the defendant. Such a case would be double hearsay, or "hearsay
within hearsay."' 52 The officer would be testifying to both his own
out-of-court conduct-assertion and the co-defendant's assertion
that the defendant was the perpetrator.1 53
149. 653 So. 2d 671, 674 (La. Ct. App. 5th 1995).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 675.
152. See LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art. 805 (2006) ("Hearsay included within
hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined
statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided by
legislation.").
153. See also State v. Bagneris, 804 So. 2d 831, 833-34 (La. Ct. App. 4th
2001), in which the detective testified that a phone call had been received, which
allowed the officers to run the phone number through a list, obtain the address
from which the call was made, and learn that the defendant lived there. The
court held that the mere fact that the jury could infer that someone may have
made a statement implicating the defendant did not constitute hearsay. Id. The
problem was the court's failure to consider the possibility that the officer's
conduct in tracing the call to make contact with the defendant, in light of
receiving a phone call incriminating the defendant, constituted an out-of-court
action-statement offered to prove the defendant's culpability. Id.
In cases like this, the officer's assertive conduct as "outer hearsay" could
possibly be admitted under a statutory hearsay exception. For example, one
statutory exception would admit the statement if the officer's conduct-statement
was consistent with his in-court testimony and was offered to rebut a charge
against him that he had an improper influence or motive for arresting the
defendant. See LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 801(D)(1)(b) (2006). However, the
"inner hearsay" of the statement made by the declarant identifying the defendant
may be inadmissible. Additionally, under an article 401/403 analysis, such
testimony carries minimal proper relevance, and the jury will probably use such
testimony of the officer's conduct as an assertion that the "inner hearsay"
declarant implicated the defendant. See PUGH ET AL., supra note 60, at 608
(citing Bagneris, 804 So. 2d 831). For a case that seems to have gotten it right,
see State v. Davis, 947 So. 2d 48, 56-57 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2006). The detective
testified that statements made by co-defendants raised his suspicions and led to
questioning of the defendant. Id. The detective's further testimony that the co-
defendants' statements did not disclose any information about the defendant
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From neglecting to consider hearsay implications of officer
testimony to confusing the explanatory exception with statutory
exceptions, the courts' misapplication of the explanatory exception
defies the Louisiana Legislature and violates criminal defendants'
rights. Reviewing Louisiana appellate decisions to see the
erroneous departure from LCE principles and supreme court
standards is easy, but caging the unruliness of the explanatory
exception to its proper scope is a more elusive task.
IV. RESOLVING THE PLOT'S CENTRAL CONFLICT: How To LEGALLY
APPLY THE EXPLANATORY EXCEPTION IN LOuIsIANA
It is possible to rein in the abuse of the Louisiana explanatory
exception and to restore it to its proper scope. Because law
enforcement officials are vital to the success of any prosecution in
providing links of the accused to the crime, the prosecution's
development of a narrative that includes the details of the officer's
investigation is properly relevant at some level.154 However, as
Louisiana appellate decisions show, the development of a narrative
at trial is recurrently achieved at the expense of unfaithfulness to
the LCE. The courts only pay lip service to the article 401/403
balancing test, giving greater deference to prosecutorial discretion
in narrating the criminal investigation 5 5 than to the defendant's
right under the hearsay rule to be free from unfair prejudice.' 56 To
once more legally apply the explanatory exception in Louisiana
and consistently afford both the defendant and the prosecution the
ability to protect their legal interests, Louisiana courts need to
adopt the following solutions: (1) return to a proper relevancy
analysis of the officer's conduct and the investigation's sequence
of events; (2) perform a more vigilant harmless error analysis in
dispelled any concerns of officer conduct implicitly asserting that the co-
defendants had implicated the defendant. See also State v. Moses, 932 So. 2d
701, 712 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2006), where the detective testified that when the
witness identified the defendant, the witness was certain of the defendant's
identity. It seems that the defendant's hearsay objection was that the detective
was implicitly asserting the content of an out-of-court statement-the witness's
statement to the detective of the witness's certainty of identity. Id. The court
excluded the statement on competency grounds, i.e., the officer's testimony as to
the contents of the witness's mind would have been speculative. Id.
154. See infra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
155. See discussion infra Part III.B-C.
156. See State v. Broadway, 753 So. 2d 801, 809 (La. 1999); State v.
Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 737 (La. 1992); State v. Wille, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1331
(La. 1990).
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cases using the explanatory exception; and (3) reformulate the
exception for logical consistency.
A. Return to a Proper Relevancy Analysis
The courts need to return to a proper relevancy analysis of out-
of-court statements offered to explain officers' conduct and to
explain the sequence of events in investigations. Although both
officer conduct and the timeline of events may be proper subjects
of relevancy, the courts need to perform circumspect analysis if the
explanatory exception is to be used without violating the LCE.
1. Explanations of an Officer's Conduct
The courts' serial use of language that officers may testify to
out-of-court statements to "explain the course of the police
investigation"' 5 7 is overly broad. First of all, courts should
recognize that an officer's conduct during his investigation is
usually irrelevant at a general criminal trial on the merits.!5 8
Logically, an officer's investigation and arrest of the defendant are
probative as to the defendant's guilt. However, an article 403
analysis suggests that a jury would not merely use the fact of the
officer's investigation as evidence of guilt, but also use the out-of-
court statement containing an assertion of criminality as evidence
of guilt.159 Louisiana Supreme Court decisions have already taken
the view that an officer's conduct is generally irrelevant; appellate
courts need only get in line.'6 0
The courts should only allow the exception when an officer's
conduct and underlying motives are facts at issue. One such
recognized category is a motion to suppress hearing, as opposed to
157. See, e.g., State v. Maise, 805 So. 2d 1141, 1152 (La. 2002) (using this
language, though resolutely excluding the statement at issue as hearsay).
158. Stephen C. Bower, Relevancy-Old Rule, New Approach, 38 REs
GESTAE 18, 18-19 (1994).
159. Id.
160. Hearold, 603 So. 2d at 737-38; Wille, 559 So. 2d at 1331. But see
Broadway, 753 So. 2d at 809 ("Information about the course of a police
investigation . . . 'draw[s] the full picture' for the jury."). There are rare cases
when an officer's conduct will be relevant on the merits after performing an
article 403 balancing test, but such rare exceptions should not swallow the
general rule against trial-on-the-merits relevance of officer conduct. For
instance, where the police officer's aggressive conduct against the defendant is
explained by an informant's tip that the defendant usually carried a gun and
wanted to kill the testifying undercover agent, the tip has proper relevance to
explain law enforcement conduct that would otherwise cause the jury to penalize
the prosecution. United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1021 (10th Cir. 1991).
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the actual criminal trial. If a defendant wishes to have evidence
excluded at trial that he believes was unconstitutionally obtained,
an evidentiary pre-trial hearing may be granted for the defendant to
prove why the evidence should be suppressed.16 1 At a motion to
suppress hearing, the explanatory exception is appropriate because
the officer's presence and the reasonableness of his conduct are
contested facts to which out-of-court statements are highly
probative.162 Officer conduct also becomes a fact at issue when the
defendant "opens the door" through questioning the police officer
on cross-examination as to the propriety of the officer's actions,163
alleging police coercion, 164 or deliberately eliciting out-of-court
statements from the officer on cross-examination to prove some
point the defendant wants to make.165
Although it is easy to see how an officer's conduct is a fact at
issue at a motion to suppress hearing or when the defendant "opens
the door," the thornier question is whether the propriety of law
enforcement action can be a fact at issue in a general criminal trial.
The obvious answer appears to be no;' 66 indeed, the supreme court
has said that an officer's conduct must be a "contested fact" to be a
fact at issue.167 However, the LCE's plain text only requires a fact
to be "of consequence" in determining the action to be the subject
161. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 703 (2003).
162. See Wille, 559 So. 2d at 1331; PUGH ETAL.,supra note 60, at607; GAIL
DALTON SCHLOSSER, LOUISIANA CRIMINAL TRIAL PRACTICE § 20:30 (4th ed.
2008); see also State v. Stewart, 656 So. 2d 677, 680 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1995)
(where reasonableness of officer's belief in having obtained consent to search
the defendant's hotel room was a fact at issue at a motion to suppress hearing,
the hotel manager's statements were highly probative to the officer's state of
mind); State v. McNair, 597 So. 2d 1096, 1099 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1992) (properly
recognizing that an officer's conduct is a fact at issue at a motion to suppress
hearing, but not at a trial). In State v. Shirley, the supreme court recently held
that the rule of hearsay is not applicable to a motion to suppress hearing, thus
foreclosing the need for the explanatory exception. 10 So. 3d 224, 228-29 (La.
2009). The court explained that the judge's ruling at a motion to suppress
hearing is the determination of a "question of fact preliminary to the
admissibility of evidence" under LCE article 1101 (C)(1), and that the judge, in
making this determination, "is not bound by the rules of evidence"-except for
privileges-under article 104. Id. (citing LA. CODE EvID. ANN. arts. 104,
1101(C)(1) (2006)).
163. BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 10:30 (2d ed.
2000).
164. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985).
165. See State v. Keelen, 670 So. 2d 578 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1996); PUGH ET
AL., supra note 60, at 621.
166. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
167. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 737 (La. 1992).
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of proper relevance.1 68 The legislative history to LCE article 401
demonstrates that evidence may be relevant to "background facts"
of the case that are undisputed-facts that enable the fact finder to
understand the evidence.169 On the other hand, the Louisiana
Legislature, having expressly forbade jurisprudentially created
hearsay exceptions,1 7 0 could not have intended a "background
exception" to the hearsay rule by which any out-of-court statement
relevant to background facts would become admissible.
Background facts are more easily comprehended as what some
legal scholars call "meta-relevance."' 7 1 The great breadth of basic
article 401 relevance has been described by the fact that "a brick is
not a wall" and has been extended even further bv one scholar who
points out that a brick is composed of atoms.' In other words,
article 401's "any tendency" language facially makes all evidence
relevant as building a small portion of the larger wall of an
ultimate fact.173  One writer describes "meta-relevance" as
information provided by a witness's testimony that has only slight
probative value, but where the event of the counsel's question and
the witness's answer has substantial value to the proponent. 174 The
problem with meta-relevance is that the tiny brick in the much
larger wall often creates unfair prejudice.' " If a defendant is
charged with theft by cutting a chain-link fence with a pair of
shears, and the prosecution introduces evidence of a prior theft by
similar means, the meta-relevance of proving an ability to commit
the crime' 76 has the danger of unfairly prejudicial use as "other
168. LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art. 401 (2006). Contrast this with the California
standard, defining relevance as the tendency to prove or disprove a "disputed"
fact. CAL. EvID. CODE § 210 (West 1995).
169. FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's note; Act No. 515, § 1, 1988
La. Acts 1068 (adopting LCE article 401); PUGH ET AL., supra note 60, at 366.
Although the federal rule advisory committee's note is not legislative history for
LCE article 401-rather, it is legislative history for FRE 401-it is a useful
interpretive guide. See supra note 18 (regarding the FRE's role as a model for
the LCE).
170. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 802 (2006).
171. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Irrelevance, Minimal Relevance, and
Meta-Relevance, 34 Hous. L. REV. 55 (1997); Christopher B. Mueller, Meta-
Evidence: Do We Need It?, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 819 (1992).
172. David Crump, On the Uses ofIrrelevant Evidence, 34 HoUs. L. REv. 1,
11(1997).
173. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 401 (2006); Crump, supra note 172, at 11.
174. Friedman, supra note 171, at 68.
175. Id. at 67.
17 6. Id.
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crimes" evidence.' 7 7 The problem with meta-relevance, or
background facts, is that evidence offered to prove such facts has
the danger of jury misuse.17 8
The Louisiana Legislature could not have intended an officer's
conduct to be a proper background fact or subject of meta-
relevance because it adopted article 403. The standalone
proposition that a fact need not be disputed for evidence related to
that fact to be admissible ignores the reality that under article 403,
evidence of an undisputed fact could be excluded. An officer's
undisputed conduct would rarely be a proper background fact
because evidence to establish it often consists of hearsay
statements. Therefore, Hearold's "contested fact" standard is
correctly based in statutory law. The reason for requiring an
officer's conduct to be "contested" for the explanatory exception to
apply is to reaffirm that though article 401 may suggest that an
officer's conduct is a background fact, article 403's unfair
prejudice standard excludes these statements because of their
improper hearsay use.179
A practical reason for the "contested fact" standard is to cure
the egregious judicial incongruity of allowing the prosecution to
use the explanatory exception to establish the reason for an
officer's conduct as a background fact, but disallowing the
exception to defendants when cross-examining officers." The
courts prevent defendants from eliciting out-of-court statements
from officers on the rationale that such testimony would neither
prove nor negate the elements of a crime.'81 Recognizing officer
conduct as a de jure background fact for the prosecution, but not
for the defendant, is unjust. Equitably, the courts should refuse to
177. See LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 404(B)(1) (2006) (stating that proof of
prior bad acts and crimes is generally not admissible to prove the defendant's
commission of the current crime for which he is prosecuted).
178. See id. art. 403; Friedman, supra note 171, at 67.
179. See FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's note. The FRE advisory
committee's note provides that some situations call for excluding evidence
offered to prove facts conceded by the opponent, but such a ruling should be
based on article 403, not a general "disputed fact" requirement. However, the
FRE are only guidance in interpreting the LCE. As the highest court interpreting
Louisiana statutory law, the Louisiana Supreme Court can rationally implement
the prohibition of hearsay statements in an officer's testimony through requiring
that officer conduct be contested. Additionally, although the LCE broadens the
admissibility of out-of-court statements overall, compared to the FRE, the scope
is still narrower in "several respects." Act No. 515, § 1, 1988 La. Acts 1085,
1200 ("Introductory Note" to Chapter 8). The explanatory exception is one such
area in which the LCE narrows the scope of admissible out-of-court statements.
180. See, e.g., State v. Berry, 684 So. 2d 439, 453 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1996);
State v. Hicks, 607 So. 2d 937, 946-47 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1992).
181. Berry, 684 So. 2d at 453; Hicks, 607 So. 2d at 947.
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allow the prosecution to use the explanatory exception when the
reasons for an officer's conduct are undisputed.
Moreover, allowing the explanatory exception to effectively
make an officer's conduct an automatic fact at issue at trial
implicates several policy concerns. Because juries are unlikely to
appreciate the personal, political, and professional pressure to et
convictions placed on prosecutors and law enforcement agents, 82
juries are unable to reliably apraise statements made by testifying
law enforcement officials. To preserve the jury from
aggrandizement in police testimony, officers should not be given
carte blanche to use statements with an improper hearsay element
to justify themselves in the jury's eyes. Additionally, the
defendant walks into a "cloud of negative inference" from the
beginning of trial.'8 5 The jury may assume that the police would
not have wasted their time and resources on this defendant unless
he was "the one."1 86 Defining officer conduct as yet another
background fact in a criminal trial adds to the jury's existent
perception of the defendant's guilt, denying the defendant the
chance to use his own set of background facts to rebut this negative
inference.187 Once the appellate courts acknowledge the "contested
fact" standard for officer conduct, some semblance of legality can
be restored to the explanatory exception.
2. Explanations of the Sequence ofEvents
A trial involves a narrative; police testimony will include the
events that occurred.18 8 Generally, for the same reasons that one
would argue that an officer's conduct could be a "background fact"
or subject of "meta-relevance," the sequence of events could also
be such background information, aiding the jury in understanding
the larger issues of the criminal case.189 However, unlike with
officer conduct, the timeline of events is almost certainly a
182. Wayne D. Garris, Jr., Current Development, Model Rule ofProfessional
Conduct 3.8: The ABA Takes a Stand Against Wrongful Convictions, 22 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 829, 840 (2009).
183. Mueller, supra note 171, at 823.
184. In fact, the rule against hearsay is designed in part to protect against
improper prosecutorial action because of known pressure placed upon
prosecutors. See id
185. Hervic, supra note 96, at 781.
18 6. Id.
187. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Eleanor Swift, Narrative Theory, FRE 803(3), and Criminal
Defendants' Post-Crime State of Mind Hearsay, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 975,
980 (2008).
189. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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background fact. The mere word "background" connotes prior
events helping one understand the central issue. 190 The question is
how much of the substance of an out-of-court statement may be
admitted under the explanatory exception to set forth the
chronology of events. To answer this question, one must first
ascertain the extent of the prosecution's need to tell a story of
events comprising the criminal case.
Anglo-American legal history' and scholarship'92
demonstrate that the modem American prosecutor has leeway in,
and the need for, telling a story. Consequently, the modem
criminal jury trial requires the prosecution to be able to tell the
story of pertinent events through law enforcement testimony 93 so
that the jury can fulfill its function of fact gathering to render an
informed verdict.194 For example, the prosecution might want to
offer Officer McFadden's testimony of an out-of-court statement,
the radio report, to establish the time when the officer deviated
from her route to investigate suspicious activity, impressing the
jury with the absence of holes in the prosecution's story.' 95
Although officer testimony is crucial to prosecutorial narrative,
the prosecution's construction of a story that will win the hearts
and minds of jurors has boundaries that should circumscribe usage
of the explanatory exception to explain the sequence of events. For
example, the prosecution cannot present a lavish chronology that
diverts the jury from its proper fact finding role, instead
190. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
131 (4th ed. 2000).
191. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 64
(2003); see also BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND
"PROBABLE CAUSE": HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW OF EVIDENCE (1991).
192. Swift, supra note 188, at 980; see also GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK
H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
145 (3d ed. 2008); John H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative
Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1069, 1087-90 (2007); John B. Mitchell, Evaluating Brady Error Using
Narrative Theory: A Proposal for Reform, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 599, 612 (2005).
193. KEVIN TIERNEY, COURTROOM TESTIMONY: A POLICEMAN'S GUIDE 1, 14
(1970); see also GILBERT B. STUCKEY, EVIDENCE FOR THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICER 1, 363 (1974).
194. See JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR
IDENTITY 6-7, 16 (1980); DELMAR KARLEN, ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 27 (1967).
195. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.c; see also Blume et al., supra note
192, at 1090; Richard 0. Lempert, Narrative Relevance, Imagined Juries, and a
Supreme Court Inspired Agenda for Jury Research, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 15, 18 (2002); Mitchell, supra note 192, at 612; Richard K. Sherwin, The
Narrative Construction ofLegal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 688-89 (1994).
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encouraging the jury's consideration of the consequences of a
verdict-the expression of social condemnation community
outrage, or some other task outside of fact finding. 6 This proper
balance is achieved through an adamant relevancy analysis-
requiring the criminal "story," told by out-of-court statements, to
have a strong logical relationship with the formal elements of the
crime such that probative worth outweighs unfair prejudice. 9 7
Louisiana trial courts and reviewing appellate courts should strictly
analyze narrative out-of-court statements under the article 403
balancing test.'9 8
To accommodate both the defendant's need of protection from
the danger of hearsay use by the jury and the prosecution's need to
tell a narrative, Louisiana courts should limit an officer's testimony
to a statement that the officer acted "upon information
received."l 99 The court's proper analysis in State v. Legendre
demonstrates a correct limitation on use of the explanatory
exception for the prosecution to develop its story of the case. 200 hn
Legendre, a detective testified that by using a record of telephone
calls made from a stolen cell phone, the detective was able to
obtain the defendant's name from an unidentified witness, which
allowed the detective to obtain a visual identification of the
defendant in a photo line-up. 2 01 The court agreed with the
defendant that probative worth to provide the "complete story" of
the investigation was outweighed b the improper use of the
statement as hearsay proof of guilt.20 The court could have more
196. James Joseph Duane, What Message Are We Sending to Criminal Jurors
When We Ask Them to "Send a Message" with Their Verdict?, 22 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 565, 612 (1995) [hereinafter Duane, Message]; see also James Joseph Duane,
"Screw Your Courage to the Sticking-Place": The Roles of Evidence,
Stipulations, and Jury Instructions in Criminal Verdicts, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 463,
467-68 (1998) [hereinafter Duane, Courage] (distrusting the prosecution being
able to influence a jury verdict through introducing evidence on some basis
other than its logical tendency to prove historical facts disputed at trial); Lenora
Ledwon, The Poetics of Evidence: Some Applications from Law & Literature,
21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2003) (suspicious of giving the prosecutor
the right to tell a story at the expense of making the prosecutor a "creative
fiction writer," rather than a "rational, scientific presenter of proofs"); Todd E.
Pettys, Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts, and Jury
Nullification, 86 IowA L. REV. 467, 511 (2001) (arguing that the prosecution's
ability to tell a morally persuasive story creates imbalance).
197. Pettys, supra note 196, at 470-71.
198. State v. Wille, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1331 (La. 1990).
199. State v. Favre, 232 So. 2d 479, 483 (La. 1970); STRONG ET AL., supra
note 49, § 249; Hervic, supra note 96, at 784.
200. 942 So. 2d 45 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2006).
201. Id.at48,54.
202. Id. at 53 (citing MARAIST, supra note 13, § 10.1, at 156 n.4).
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concretely stated that the officer was limited to stating that he
acted "upon information received" to place the photograph in the
line-up. This must be the standard, or courts will continue to use
the explanatory exception to introduce unfairly prejudicial
evidence.
An officer can legitimately explain his investigation through
stating that he acted upon information that he received. Such
testimony does not violate the hearsay rule because it does not
include the substance of any assertion made by a declarant who
supplied the officer with investigative information. 20 3 Further, if
the defendant is concerned that the "upon information received"
testimony will cause the jury to speculate about the particular
information that the officer received, the defendant ma
purposefully "open the door" by cross-examining the officer.2
The defendant could contest the propriety of the investigation,
which would allow the court to admit the substance of out-of-court
statements as nonhearsay, pursuant to Hearold.205
Although an officer's testimony that he acted "upon
information received" would strike a proper balance in allowing
the prosecution to fill any gaps in its story, the 1997 U.S. Supreme
Court opinion in Old Chief v. United States206 threatens to quash
the above discussion regarding circumscribed storytelling
relevance. 207 Louisiana courts overwhelmingly cite to Old Chief as
persuasive authority, regrettably impacting the explanatory
exception in Louisiana.2 0 Justice Souter's opinion in the case
203. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45. This was the historical rule,
when the exception was first articulated.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 163-65.
205. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 737 (La. 1992).
206. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
207. The case has resulted in scholar after scholar expressing astonishment at
the new implications the case has for a storytelling relevancy analysis. See, e.g.,
Duane, Courage, supra note 196, at 467-68 (referring to the court's opinion as
"breathtakingly radical" and with "virtually no supporting authority"); Ledwon,
supra note 196, at 1146 ("[W]hat in heaven's name is the Supreme Court doing
by speaking approvingly of a prosecutor's right to tell 'a story of guiltiness'?");
Pettys, supra note 196, at 472 (calling the court's opinion a "momentous
proposition"). But see Mitchell, supra note 192, at 613 (stating that the Court
aligned its understanding of how jury trials work with that of law academics,
though questioning just how far this legitimation of narrative theory leads).
208. See, e.g., State v. Robertson, 988 So. 2d 166, 172-73 (La. 2008); State
v. Thornton, 979 So. 2d 486, 487 (La. 2008); State v. Love, 847 So. 2d 1198,
1204 (La. 2003); State v. Taylor, 838 So. 2d 729, 743 (La. 2003); State v. Ball,
824 So. 2d 1089, 1115 (La. 2002); State v. Mitchell, 779 So. 2d 698, 702 (La.
2001); State v. Broadway, 753 So. 2d 801, 809 (La. 1999); State v. Colomb, 747
So. 2d 1074, 1076 (La. 1999); State v. Ridgley, 7 So. 3d 689, 697 (La. Ct. App.
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contains dicta2 09 that gives prosecutors an arsenal of weaponry
with which to forcefully advance their storytelling agenda.210
Taking Old Chiefs momentous propositions one piece at a
time, like the character in the clever Johnny Cash song," the first
proposition is that the prosecution should be able to use evidence
that convinces the jury that a guilty verdict would be "morally
reasonable."212 This signifies that the admissibility of evidence is
contingent upon its ability to influence not only a juror's mind, but
also his heart, in a way that may supplant the logical determination
of whether the elements of a crime are fulfilled. 13 Such a standard
of moral satisfaction with a guilty verdict2 14 bears the potential to
introduce evidence that is not only irrelevant to the crime, but also
unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. 2 15 Next, Old Chief proposes
that prosecutorial narrative is necessary to meet the jury's
expectations as to what proper proof should be.216 This broadens
relevance far beyond demonstrating the elements of a crime being
5th 2009); State v. Benoit, 885 So. 2d 625, 634 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2004). This is
but a small sampling.
209. "Obiter dictum" is a statement made in passing. It encompasses that
which is not the holding of a case. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (9th ed.
2009). It is well established that the portions of the opinion addressing storytelling
relevance are dicta. See Duane, Courage, supra note 196, at 463; Aviva Orenstein,
Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403,
90 CORNELL L. REv. 1487, 1502 n.49 (2005); Jeffrey Zahler, Allowing Defendants
to Present Evidence of Prison Conditions to Convince Juries to Nullify: Can Only
the Prosecutor Present "Moral" Evidence?, 34 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 485,489-90 (2008).
210. One author has asserted that "[1]awyers one century from now may look
back on Old Chief as the beginning of a gradual but radical shift in our
collective conception of the criminal trial process." Duane, Courage, supra note
196, at 469.
211. See JOHNNY CASH, One Piece at a Time, on ONE PIECE AT A TIME
(Columbia Records 1976), in which a factory worker steals various automobile
parts over the years, finally assembling a car from the spare parts in his own
driveway and later driving across the country to display the finished product.
Just as with the character in the comical tune, assembly of Old Chiefs various
parts leads to a potentially hodgepodge result, though the implications for the
criminal defendant are nothing to laugh at.
212. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188-89 (1997).
213. Duane, Courage, supra note 196, at 467. Whether laudable or not, it is
nothing short of revolutionary for the Court to broaden relevance to include
subjective moral facts. See id. at 468.
214. See Duane, Message, supra note 196, at 612.
215. Lempert, supra note 195, at 18. Adding moral considerations to increase
the weight given to the probative worth of the prosecution's evidence greatly
increases the unfair prejudice that the defendant will be forced to show in order
to have evidence excluded under article 403. Pettys, supra note 196, at 516.
216. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188-89.
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met. Last is the proposition that the prosecution has the right to
avoid breaks in the natural sequence of narrative evidence. 2 18 More
than acknowledging an Anglo-American legal heritage of proper
prosecutorial narrative, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded
relevance to include moral considerations and narrative largesse
that add great probative worth to out-of-court statements used in
prosecutorial storytelling.2 1 9
The point of setting out the revolutionary nature of Old Chief is
not to deprecate it as a federal jurisprudential derelict. The problem
is that Old Chief impermissibly broadens the Louisiana usage of
the explanatory exception in the police officer storytelling context.
Although federal courts have used Old Chief to broaden the federal
explanatory exception, 220 Louisiana is not bound by the case's
holding both because it is not a holding-it is dicta 22-and
because it is a case addressing the FRE, not the LCE.222 Alas, the
third case in the Louisiana Supreme Court explanatory exception
trilogy, Broadway, cites to Old Chief 223 However, Broadway's use
of Old Chief for the proposition that the prosecution has some
leeway in presenting a full picture for the jury is also dicta-the
court in Broadway found that the prosecution did not need the out-
of-court statement to tell the full story.224 Ever since Broadway,
other Louisiana courts have incorporated Old Chiefs reasoning
side-by-side with the explanatory exception analysis. 2 25 However,
217. Duane, Courage, supra note 196, at 467-68; Pettys, supra note 196, at
472. Prior to this case, there was no such normative claim that the jury's
expectations determine which evidence is relevant; satisfying a juror's
expectations was an ancillary benefit provided only when article 403 did not
exclude the evidence. Pettys, supra note 196, at 472. Now, under the U.S.
Supreme Court's formulation, a juror's expectations of how the story should
emerge at trial are the threshold for admitting evidence. Old Chief 519 U.S. at
187-88 (stating that the "fair and legitimate weight" of evidence is determined
in part by whether it meets "the jurors' expectations about what proper proof
should be"); Pettys, supra note 196, at 472.
218. Old Chief 519 U.S. at 189. One author asserts that the opinion makes
the prosecutor sound like a "creative fiction writer." Ledwon, supra note 196, at
1146.
219. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
220. Hervic, supra note 96, at 789 (calling the case a "launching pad" to
justify the explanatory exception in virtually all instances of out-of-court
statements within police testimony).
221. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
222. Old Chief 519 U.S. at 178.
223. State v. Broadway, 753 So. 2d 801, 809 (La. 1999) (citing Old Chief
519 U.S. 172).
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, No. 2008-KA-0517, 2009 WL 282734 at *5
(La. Ct. App. 4th Jan. 28, 2009); State v. Carter, 981 So. 2d 734, 753 (La. Ct.
App. 3d 2008); State v. Allen, 800 So. 2d 378, 393 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2001). All
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Louisiana appellate courts can remedy this problem by not
following what may be characterized as "dicta within dicta."
Louisiana courts should not use the "enhanced" relevance of
Old Chief to create heightened storytelling relevance to admit
officers' out-of-court statements. Under Louisiana's article
401/403 test, out-of-court statements having probative value to
persuade jurors' hearts and minds that a guilty verdict is morally
reasonable is not properly relevant. 226 Louisiana courts must reject
the Old Chief enhanced relevance model and require that when an
officer offers sequence-of-events evidence, he should state that he
acted "upon information received." 2 27 The potential of jury misuse
is too high to tolerate if an officer specifically repeats definite
complaints of criminal activi&. 228 Returning to this standard that
existed many decades ago2 is necessary to reject unfairly
prejudicial information disguised as legally sanctified storytelling.
B. Perform a More Vigilant Harmless Error Analysis
When a trial court improperly uses the explanatory exception,
the harm done to a defendant can be mended through a reviewing
court's proper harmless error analysis. In Louisiana, harmless error
and the explanatory exception are highly connected; Wille and
Broadway both used the harmless error rule to avoid reversing
convictions in trials where the explanatory exception was
improperly used. 230 The harmless error rule states that in a criminal
trial if an error does not affect a defendant's substantial rights, the
error was harmless, and the conviction may stand.23 1 An erroneous
of these cases cite to Old Chief directly after citing to Hearold's "contested fact"
language.
226. See Duane, Courage, supra note 196, at 467 (pointing out that Old Chief
adds these considerations to the probative worth test under article 403).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 199-205.
228. See EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 248 (2d
ed. 1972).
229. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
230. State v. Broadway, 753 So. 2d 801, 818 (La. 1999) (finding that the
"very serious confrontation error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt");
State v. Wille, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1332-33 (La. 1990) (finding that the conviction
need not be overturned because the admission of hearsay was harmless error
beyond a reasonable doubt and because the prosecution's case was extremely
strong).
231. ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 7.3
(1986). Harmless error is one of the pillars of American criminal trial procedure,
especially at the level of appellate review. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,
284 (1993) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra, § 7.3. The
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use of the explanatory exception potentially violates a defendant's
substantial right,232  triggering the Louisiana harmless error
statute.233 If the appellate court determines that the error
contributed to the verdict, it is harmful error.2 34 In some cases, the
jury's verdict clearly would have been "guilty" even if the
explanatory exception had not been used erroneously. 2 35 However,
in cases where the particular out-of-court statements are direct
assertions of the defendant's guilt or are used to explain the
officer's ostensibly righteous investigation such that other
exculpatory evidence is undermined, a reviewing court should
exercise more caution before determining that no substantial right
was violated.236
With improper explanatory exception usage, as with other
evidentiary violations, circumspect harmless error analysis is
rationale for the rule is that a mistrial is a drastic remedy. State v. Ducre, 827 So.
2d 1120, 1120 (La. 2002).
232. Violations of the LCE can be substantial violations of a criminal
defendant's rights because the LCE provides a framework for determining the
truth in a securely fair manner. See LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 102 (2006)
(stating that the LCE is designed to secure fairness in administering the law of
evidence). Article 102 provides that the ascertainment of truth is not the only
policy underlying the Code, but also just determination of the proceedings. Id.;
see also Addison K. Goff, IV, Mixed Signals: A Look at Louisiana's Experience
with Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 59 LA. L. REV. 1169, 1184-85 (1999)
(evidentiary rules are designed to guarantee a fair trial, so their violation should
constitute harmful error).
233. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 921 (2008). Further, in many cases
where the explanatory exception is improperly used, the fact that there was
testimonial hearsay raises Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause concerns.
Though this Comment focuses on the explanatory exception as a violation of the
hearsay statute, the explanatory exception also has a high potential to violate the
Confrontation Clause. See discussion supra Part II.D.3. Such a constitutional
violation would almost certainly violate a "substantial right" of the defendant,
requiring a finding of harmful error. One law review article has already argued
that the explanatory exception under the federal hearsay rule compromises
defendants' right of confrontation. Hervic, supra note 96.
234. Alfred Paul LeBlanc, Jr., Considerations Concerning Harmless Error in
Louisiana Criminal Cases, 64 LA. L. REV. 21, 31, 35 (2003) (citing State v.
Harris, 711 So. 2d 266 (La. 1998)).
235. See, e.g., Wille, 559 So. 2d at 1332-33 (where there was full
corroboration by "numerous evidentiary links between defendant, the victim and
the crime" through fingerprints, strong circumstantial evidence, physical
evidence, and the defendant's fully corroborated testimony, the admission of
hearsay was harmless).
236. LeBlanc, supra note 234, at 36, 38.
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essential 237 to avoid unfair and mischievous results, especially
when the question of guilt or innocence is a close one. Without
careful use, the rule effectively allows the State to break
evidentiary rules as often as it wants, as long as the defendant is
probably guilty.239 With the explanatory exception in particular,
the Louisiana appellate courts have used a sloppy harmless error
analysis.
Because harmless error is a remedial doctrine, Louisiana
appellate courts should not reach the harmless error question until
first determining that the trial record contains legal error.240
actuality, the appellate courts' approval of the explanatory
exception is often carelessly riddled with statements to the effect
that even if the trial court should not have used the exception, the
admission of the out-of-court statement was harmless such that the
conviction will stand. Astonishingly, in some of these instances,
the court will literally say that "even if' it was hearsay, admitting it
was harmless error. 41 Other times, the court will state that "any
possible" harm to the defendant resulting from the officer's
testimony being improperly admitted is cured by the harmless error
doctrine's automatic solution to the problem, sugosedly absolving
the court of its decision to abort further analysis.
237. State v. Michelli, 301 So. 2d 577, 579 (La. 1974) (besmirching the
harmless error rule as a potential "cop out" and an "abdication of the judicial
function in criminal appeals").
238. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
239. James E. Boren & Michael A. Fiser, Fear of a Paper Tiger: Enforcing
Louisiana's Procedural and Statutory Rules in the Wake of Harmless Error
Analysis, 64 LA. L. REv. 5, 17 (2003).
240. LeBlanc, supra note 234, at 29.
241. State v. Davis, 947 So. 2d 48, 57 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2006)
("Nevertheless, even if some of the testimony was inadmissible hearsay and
went beyond what was necessary to explain the steps taken in the investigation,
the admission was harmless."); State v. Cowart, 815 So. 2d 275, 289 (La. Ct.
App. 5th 2002) (even if hearsay, it is subject to a harmless error analysis); State
v. Soler, 636 So. 2d 1069, 1078 (La. Ct. App. 5th 1994) (even assuming it was
hearsay, it was harmless); State v. Byrd, 540 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (La. Ct. App. 1st
1989) (even assuming it was hearsay, harmless error).
242. State v. Grant, 954 So. 2d 823, 833 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007) ("Further,
the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence does not require reversal of the
conviction when the error is harmless beyond reasonable doubt."); State v.
Moses, 932 So. 2d 701, 712 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2006) ("any possible harm" in
admitting the testimony was harmless); State v. Zeigler, 920 So. 2d 949, 955
(La. Ct. App. 2d 2006) ("any erroneous admission of hearsay" did not require
reversal); see also State v. Jones, 999 So. 2d 239, 250-51 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008)
(holding that the statements were nonhearsay after discussing the possibility of
finding any potential error to be harmless, indicating a judicial lack of
willingness to stand by a holding that the statements were nonhearsay).
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The confusion is even more pronounced in appellate decisions
that fail to articulate whether the holding is (1) that the explanatory
exception was properly used or (2) that the exception should not
have been used but the error was harmless. One Louisiana
appellate court opinion discussed harmless error in advance of its
hearsay discussion, suggesting that the court was only trying to
reach the result of getting the statement admitted, regardless of its
legality.243 The same court said that the police's "testimony was
not hearsay and admitting such into evidence did not constitute
harmful error."244 If it was not hearsay, why say that it was not
harmful error, other than to cover all one's bases in judicially
admitting the evidence? The disingenuousness of these decisions
extends to one court skipping analysis of the out-of-court statement
to find that the police testimony was harmless error. 245 No less
nebulous was another court's statement asserting first that harmless
error does not require reversal, next that the statements were not
offered to prove the defendant's guilt, and lastly that "any error in
this regard" was harmless.246 Perhaps most egregious was one
court's abandonment of not only the "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard adopted by the Louisiana Supreme
Court,247 but also of any sense of protecting a defendant's
substantial rights.2 48 The court mused that it was "highly unlikely"
that the defendant was convicted on the strength of hearsay
249
evidence. Such confusion and slipshod analysis has effectively
morphed the explanatory exception into a subspecies of harmless
error, confusing correctness with error, attempting to make
something into that which is against its nature. Ironically, the
problematic harmless error analysis could become the solution if
harmless error and the explanatory exception were properly
maintained as separate analyses.
Harm done to a defendant through a trial court's erroneous use
of the explanatory exception could easily be cured by a proper
harmless error analysis, which the appellate courts have yet to
consistently perform. The "even if' and "regardless" approaches to
243. State v. Smith, 710 So. 2d 1187, 1190 (La. Ct. App. 5th 1998). An
honest approach would be for a court opinion to read, "We think he did it, but
rules are rules, and the rules that were broken made the trial unfair," before
deciding whether the resulting unfairness has violated a defendant's substantial
right. See Boren & Fiser, supra note 239, at 10.
244. Smith, 710 So. 2d at 1190.
245. State v. Baker, 720 So. 2d 767, 774 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1998).
246. State v. Haygood, 641 So. 2d 1074, 1078-79 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1994).
247. State v. Gibson, 391 So. 2d 421, 428 (La. 1980).
248. State v. Dangerfield, 816 So. 2d 885, 897 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2002).
249. Id.
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harmless error unacceptably ignore the fact that harmless error
review is only permissible after first determining whether an error
has occurred. If courts will abandon these improper approaches,
they will attend to their normative function of establishing limits
upon the prosecution's elicitation of police officer testimony about
the particular out-of-court statements in the case. 251 Therefore, in
future cases, prosecutors will not think that they have more latitude
than they actually have and defendants will have guidance in
forming an adequate trial strategy.252 The inconsistent application
of the explanatory exception shows that proper harmless error
analysis is especially important to establish standards for when the
prosecution has overstepped its bounds and violated the hearsay
rule.
The LCE prohibits jurisprudentially created hearsay
exceptions, 253 and courts serially pronounce that inappropriate
admission of statements under the explanatory exception is non-
reversible harmless error. Such jurisprudence has effectively
carved out an illegitimate, non-statutory hearsay exception that
will almost always allow the prosecution to violate the hearsay
rule.254 The appellate courts must return to a prudent harmless
error analysis, in which judicial opinions precede such analysis
with a finding of whether or not the explanatory exception was
properly used at trial. Such judicial carefulness will limit unfair
prejudice to defendants and will restore legal application of the
explanatory exception by establishing proper norms for
prosecutors who will question officers in future cases.255
250. LeBlanc, supra note 234, at 39.
251. Id
252. See id
253. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 802 (2006).
254. There is the possibility that the ubiquitous use of harmless error coupled
with the explanatory exception deprives criminal defendants of due process of
law guaranteed by the Louisiana Constitution. The Louisiana Constitution
assures to criminal defendants the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 16. Proof must be made in conformity with the rules of
evidence, and when the explanatory exception is illegally used to admit a
hearsay statement that illegitimately has the effect of proving guilt, the
explanatory exception unconstitutionally removes the defendant's presumption
of innocence. See id The Louisiana Constitution also provides that a criminal
defendant is entitled to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him and to
compel the attendance of witnesses. Id.
255. Until the courts return to a more vigilant harmless error analysis, and
even if they do, it is crucial that the defendant thoroughly brief harmless error on
appeal, establishing a connection between weakness in the overall trial evidence
and the particular erroneously admitted statement(s), to show that the error was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See URSULA BENTELE & EVE CARY,
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C. Reformulate the Explanatory Exception
Returning to a proper relevancy analysis and to a vigilant
harmless error analysis are problem-solving applications of the
explanatory exception. A third option to legitimize the exception's
use in Louisiana and return to protecting defendants' rights where
police testimony is concerned is to reformulate the exception, or at
least rethink the theory behind it, to achieve consistent results.
At the outset, the Louisiana Supreme Court needs to carefully
revisit the requirement stated in Hearold that an officer's conduct
must be a "contested fact" for the explanatory exception to
apply. 25 As previously discussed, Louisiana courts have
automatically considered officer conduct to be a de jure
background fact to which an officer's testimony concerning out-of-
court statements is relevant, regardless of whether in reality the
propriety of the police investigation is disputed or questioned in a
given case. 257 The courts have shown no movement toward
actually applying the "contested fact" requirement, 258 so the
supreme court needs to revisit this requirement, reaffirming its
importance. Although a proper article 403 analysis would have the
same effect in limiting the explanatory exception when the need to
explain an officer's conduct is outweighed by the jury's potential
use of the evidence as hearsay, 25 9 the highest court of this state
should articulate the standard that the court will require in judging
the relevance of an officer's presence or conduct: article 403, the
"contested fact" standard, or both.
The exception also needs an overhaul through the drastic, yet
simple, reform of not calling it the "explanatory exception." The
federal courts that appl this same concept under the FRE do not
call it an "exception.' o Although the FRE are not the law in
Louisiana, this approach is certainly capable of application in
Louisiana. When permissibly allowing an officer to testify about
statements made to him during the investigation, a court does not
really admit the statements under an explanatory "exception," but
as nonhearsay.26 1 If the courts will simply articulate that a
statement is proper nonhearsay, they will avoid the conceptual
APPELLATE ADVOCACY: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 284-85 (4th ed. 2004);
LeBlanc, supra note 234, at 40.
256. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 737 (La. 1992).
257. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
258. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
259. See discussion supra Part II.D. 1.
260. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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inconsistency of citing to prior explanatory exception language
from other cases without a proper analysis of the underlying
statutory hearsay rule.
A more radically effective method would be revisiting
jurisprudence constante's perpetuation of the exception. The
appellate courts are free to-and should-cease mere regurgitation
of the precedent 262 that an officer may testify "about statements
made to him by other persons involved in the case in order to
explain [his] actions. 4 If not altogether abolished, this
precedential language should be revised to elucidate the true
legitimate scope of the nonhearsay rule: a police officer may refer
to statements made to him to explain the sequence of events, from
the officer's viewpoint, leading to the defendant's arrest when the
officer's conduct is a contested fact, or when there is proper
narrative relevance to the investigation under an article 403 test
showing that the defendant will not be unfairly prejudiced. If it is
precedent they want, this is the essential formulation that Wille
originally required, anyway.2 64
Finally, the appellate courts' fresh look at the explanatory
exception should include an approach under which an appellate
court's review of the trial record takes into account the objective
effect of admitting a statement. Whether a statement is hearsay
depends upon whether it is "offered to prove" the truth of the
matter asserted.26 5 The courts often determine whether the out-of-
court statement is "offered" for its truth by focusing on the
subjective intent of the prosecution, the alleged proper use.266 A
better approach is for the courts to decide whether the statement is
offered for its truth by determining whether the statement has the
objective effect of being used as an assertion of the statement's
truth. Such an approach would properly account for both the
262. Because Louisiana has jurisprudence constante, not stare decisis, the
appellate courts are free to abolish their own precedential language. See Willis-
Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Comm'n, 903 So. 2d
1071, 1087-88 nn.16-17 (La. 2005); Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119,
128-29 (La. 2000); Albert Tate, Jr., Civilian Methodology in Louisiana, 44 TUL.
L. REv. 673, 678 (1970).
263. State v. Henry, 27 So. 3d 935, 944 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2009); see also
supra text accompanying notes 39, 43.
264. State v. Wille, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1331 (La. 1990) (citing GEORGE W.
PUGH, LOUISIANA EvIDENCE LAW 429-31 (1974)) ("The fact that an officer
acted on information received in an out-of-court assertion may be relevant to
explain his conduct, but this fact should not become a passkey to bring before
the jury the substance of the out-of-court information that would otherwise be
barred by the hearsay rule.").
265. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 801(C) (2006).
266. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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prosecution's need for the statement and the defendant's right to
not be prejudiced by improper jury misuse.267 Solely considering
the prosecution's ostensible intent ignores the fact that a statement
with a definite complaint of criminal behavior of the accused will
be used by the jury as evidence of guilt.26 8 Focusing on objective
effects, coupled with the courts' re-examination of the theory
behind the explanatory exception, will avoid the mere continuation
of precedent, protect defendants' rights, and give notice to
prosecutors as to what questions they may properly ask officers at
trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Louisiana appellate courts have virtually carved out a
jurisprudential exception to the hearsay rule that is non-statutory
and therefore illegal. The courts must now properly apply the
explanatory exception to fulfill the hearsay rule's purpose of
protecting against improper prosecutorial action2 6 9 and to protect
defendants from the admission of statements lacking the indicia of
reliability that the hearsay rule was designed to provide. The
condoning of prosecutorial misconduct must cease, and the courts
must now establish norms for proper questioning of police
witnesses crucial to criminal trial testimony. The defendant should
not have to perform this role for the courts, which are bound to
uphold the LCE.
To accomplish these ends, Louisiana courts should rein in
prosecutorial storytelling by circumscribing the explanatory
exception. They must limit the exception's use to explain officer
conduct to when an officer's conduct is a contested fact and limit
the exception's use to explain the sequence of events to the officer
stating that he acted "upon information received." The appellate
courts must also perform a vigilant harmless error analysis and
renew the exception's consistent application through calling it
"nonhearsay" rather than an "exception," doing an analysis instead
of merely reciting previous erroneous chains of precedential
wording, and considering the likely effect of an out-of-court
statement upon the jury.
Although Officer Mary McFadden cannot articulate her theory
of the investigation with the skill of a seasoned litigator, her
267. See State v. Broadway, 753 So. 2d 801, 810 (La. 1999); State v.
Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 737 (La. 1992); Wille, 559 So. 2d at 1331.
268. GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 801:5; PUGH ET AL., supra note 60, at 607.
269. Mueller, supra note 171, at 823 (recognizing that the hearsay rule
protects against known pressure placed on prosecutors).
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experience on the streets has taught her when her "hunch" of the
defendant's guilt is likely something that should make her pull her
car over and investigate Joe Schmeaux. 270 Officer McFadden may
want to testify about what someone told her that gave her that
reliable hunch-the hunch she has come to know will usually lead
her to handcuffing a criminal, and the prosecutor has a legitimate
interest in asking questions that will elicit this information.
However, Louisiana has rules of evidence to which the officer is as
equally bound as are other witnesses whose testimony protects the
public from malefactors. One instructional textbook written to train
law enforcement on the rules of evidence at trial muses that the law
of evidence is a game with many roadblocks, obstructions that can
be circumvented by clever maneuvering. 27 1 It is time for Louisiana
courts' application of the explanatory exception to require officers
and their fellow prosecuting attorneys to play by the game's rules
so that clever maneuvering ends where the firm bulwark of the
LCE begins.
Joshua P. Clayton*
270. See Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59
VAND. L. REv. 407, 466 (2006) ("Just because police officers fail to frame their
words in the approved language of the courts, or are unable to express
themselves with the glibness of a skilled litigator, does not mean that they acted
unreasonably given the factual situation they faced.").
271. See KLEIN, supra note 12, at 3.
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